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Strict in the Wrong Places: State Crowdfunding
Exemptions' Failure To Effectively Balance
Investor Protection and Capital Raising
ANNALISE H. FARRIS
ABSTRACT
In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, which
created an exemption from securities registration for crowdfunded capital
raises. Although it was not until May of 2016 that the Securities and
Exchange Commission's rules implementing this exemption took effect,
many states used the interim period to enact crowdfunding exemptions of
their own.
Although most of these exemptions aim to increase small businesses'
access to capital while still providing adequate investor protection, the
exemptions differ greatly in their individual applications. Consequently, a
comparison of these exemptions provides a useful analysis of effective
regulation in an area of the law new to all players. This Article provides a
survey of several state crowdfunding exemptions, focusing on critical
characteristics that affect the success of the offering. This Article argues
that many of the existing state exemptions fail to effectively help companies
raise capital or protect investors against fraud, but instead are overly
restrictive in their financial restraints while being too lenient in their
investor protection measures. It then suggests a state exemption
framework intended to better serve the companies and investors utilizing
crowdfunding exemptions.
* Attorney at Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, Raleigh N.C. The author would like to
thank Professor John F. Coyle at the University of North Carolina School of Law for his
guidance in writing this Article and to the Campbell Law Review staff for their hard work in
its publication.
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INTRODUCTION
Equity crowdfunding is a new form of capital raising that relies on
many individuals contributing to a company via the internet in exchange
for equity in the company.' The popularity of equity crowdfunding has
increased in recent years, due at least in part to the combined effect of two
1. See infra Part II.
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independent trends.2 The first of these is the revived emphasis on small
business growth in the United States.3 According to the U.S. Small
Business Administration, "[s]mall businesses provide[d] 55% of all jobs
and 66% of all net new jobs since the 1970s,"4 making small businesses an
integral part of economic growth in the United States. Unfortunately, small
businesses were exceptionally affected by the financial crisis of 2007,
experiencing a 60% decline in jobs from December 2007 until February
2010.5 As a result, both regulators and consumers recognized the
importance of supporting small and local businesses, evidenced by the
wave of pro-small business legislation and consumer initiatives.6  This
emphasis on small businesses has continued, even after many small
businesses have recovered from the effects of the financial crisis.7
The second trend affecting the popularity of equity crowdfunding is
the success of other forms of crowdfunding, particularly for new consumer
products. Online portals, such as Kickstarter,8 have demonstrated that
ordinary people are willing, perhaps too willing, to invest their money in
new ventures. Over $2 billion has been raised on Kickstarter alone since
its launch in 2009.9 These types of crowdfunding campaigns differ from
equity crowdfunding, as investors generally receive a product rather than
an investment interest in exchange for their funds.10 Nevertheless, the
2. See Small Business, Big Impact!, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/
content/small-business-trends-impact [https://perma.cc/5BY3-BSEX] (last visited May 3,
2016).
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Brayden McCarthy, What Happened to America's Small Businesses During the
Financial Crisis? Six Years After the Start of the Crisis, We Look Back in Nine Charts,
FUNDERA (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.fundera.com/blog/2014/09/16/happened-americas-
small-businesses-financial-crisis-six-years-start-crisis-look-back- 10-charts/ [https://perma.
cc/4NE2-N2QW].
6. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Small Business
Saturday, AM. ExPRESs, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/small-business/shop-small/
[https://perma.cc/JQL4-SGQR] (last visited May 4, 2016) (describing "Small Business
Saturday" as a "showing your love for the small businesses in your community").
7. Frank Newport, U.S. Small-Business Owners Most Optimistic Since 2008, GALLUP
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164069/small-business-owners-optimistic-
2008.aspx_[https://perma.cc/2GQK-HQFG]. But see McCarthy, supra note 5.
8. The Kickstarter Fulfillment Report, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/
?ref-nav [https://perma.cc/52UE-JDQZ] (last visited May 4, 2016).
9. Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/
help/faq/kickstarter+basics?ref=faqnav#Kick [https://perma.cc/8D5A-W8UQ] (last visited
May 4, 2016).
10. See infra Part II.
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success of these campaigns has persuaded many that the same results are
possible when contributions are made in exchange for equity as well.
Lawmakers at both the federal and state levels have embraced the idea
that crowdfunding could help promote small business growth." Yet
securities registration laws, known for being onerous on small businesses,
posed a major obstacle for small businesses seeking to raise funds through
crowdfunding.1 2  The result has been the enactment of numerous
crowdfunding exemptions enabling certain companies to raise capital from
smaller investors without meeting traditional registration requirements. 13
Although Congress was an early proponent of crowdfunding, passing an
exemption in 2012,14 the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
delay in implementing the exemption prevented companies from utilizing
the exemption thus far.' 5 However, the delay at the federal level did not
prevent states from considering and passing their own crowdfunding
exemptions from state security registration laws. To date, twenty-eight
states have passed crowdfunding exemptions.' 6  Numerous other states
have considered such exemptions,17 but only three have considered and
rejected crowdfunding exemptions." Perhaps due to the quickness in
11. See infra Parts III and IV.
12. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Parts III and IV.
14. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
15. The SEC, after much delay, issued final rules on the crowdfunding exemption on
October 30, 2015. See SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding: Proposes Amendments
to Existing Rules To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
249.html [https://perma.cc/6AFG-4YPG]. The new rules and forms will become effective
180 days after they are published in the Federal Register, but the forms enabling funding
portals to register with the SEC became effective on January 29, 2016. Id.
16. The twenty-eight states are: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See infra Part IV.
17. See, e.g., H.B. 5577, 2014 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2014).
18. The three states are California, North Carolina, and Utah. In North Carolina, the
original crowdfunding legislation (JOBS Act) passed in the State House almost
unanimously, but failed to make it out of the Senate; however, a new bill, based on the
original JOBS Act, has been "reviewed and approved by the NC Secretary of State
Securities Division, the NC Commerce Department, and the NC JOBS/PACES Act business
team, and is now awaiting action by the General Assembly." 2015 Can Be the Year for
Intrastate Investment Crowdfunding in North Carolina, N.C. PACES ACT (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://jobsnc.blogspot.com/2015/01/iinvestment-crowdfunding-is-expanding.html
[https://perma.cc/P2VF-VVF3]; see also S.B. 481, 2015 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015). California
had a similar experience, with one crowdfunding exemption dying in the 2014 legislative
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which these state exemptions were enacted, they differ greatly in their
requirements and scope. Consequently, a comparison of these exemptions
provides a useful analysis of effective regulation in an area of the law new
to all players.
Though the merits of equity crowdfunding have been the focus of
much discussion, this Article argues that, when properly regulated, the
benefits of such exemptions can outweigh the concerns associated with
them. This Article therefore considers the state exemptions through a lens
of general acceptance of equity crowdfunding. Under this approach, this
Article argues that many of the existing state exemptions fail to effectively
help companies raise capital or protect investors against fraud, but instead
are overly restrictive in their financial restraints while being too lenient in
their investor protection measures.
Analysis proceeds in six parts. Part I briefly delineates the securities
registration laws, including the federal and state regulatory scheme,
existing prior to the enactment of crowdfunding exemptions. Part II
provides background on crowdfunding, examining the different forms of
crowdfunding as well as the purported benefits and disadvantages of
crowdfunding. Part III then describes some of the early proposals for
crowdfunding exemptions, including the federal exemption, in order to
show the basic structure of a crowdfunding exemption, as well as how such
exemptions have developed over time. Part IV surveys a number of
existing and proposed state-level exemptions, analyzing the exemptions
based on critical characteristics. Part V, focusing on these critical
characteristics, identifies flaws in the state exemptions and possible
improvements. Finally, Part VI suggests a state exemption framework
intended to maximize the utility of a crowdfunding exemption, while still
reducing the risk of fraud.
I. BACKGROUND OF SECURITY REGISTRATION LAWS
The 1933 Securities Act marked the first step in regulating securities
by the federal government.1 9 The Act has two basic objectives: first, to
session, only to have another introduced in the 2015 session. See JD Alois, California
Legislation for Equity Crowdfunding Climbs Sacramento Once Again, CROWDFUND INSIDER
(Apr. 1, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/04/65393-califomia-
legislation-for-equity-crowdfunding-climbs-sacramento-once-again/
[https://perma.cc/N5GN-DZ6T]; Assemb. B. 2096, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
19. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2012); see also Thomas Lee Hazen,
Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the
Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1735, 1741-42 (2012).
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"require that investors receive financial and other significant information
concerning securities being offered for public sale;" and second, to
"prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of
securities." 2 0 The Act was based on the theory that full information and
disclosure would be the most effective means of investor protection. 2 1 To
achieve these goals, the Act restricted how companies could raise funds by
prohibiting any offering or public sale of a security unless it is registered
22
with the SEC or it meets a statutory exemption. Registration generally
requires providing "a description of the company's properties," business,
and management, "a description of the security to be offered for sale," and
audited financial statements.23
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act then created the SEC to regulate
the securities industry and imposed reporting requirements for certain
companies.24 Companies that are registered under the 1933 Act, that have
securities widely traded in secondary markets, or that meet certain
thresholds of assets or shareholders must meet these reporting
requirements. 2 5 The 1934 Act also imposed requirements on intermediaries
that facilitate the sale of securities.26 In 1946, the United States Supreme
Court explained that a security is "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party," in
what became known as the Howey definition of a security. 2 7
While investor protection is a primary goal of these policies, the
federal government recognized that such requirements could impede other
important policies. Security registration is a time-consuming and
expensive process that can severely limit access to funding, particularly for
20. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml [https://perma.cc/B9FK-AUMT] (last modified Oct. 1,
2013).
21. Hazen, supra note 19, at 1741-42 (citing Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY 92 (1934)).
22. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012)).
23. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 20.
24. Id. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 885
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012)).
25. Hazen, supra note 19, at 1741-42. The JOBS Act increased the number of
shareholders to trigger registration requirements to 2,000 shareholders of record, provided
that less than 500 of them are unaccredited investors. Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012).
27. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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small businesses. 8 In fact, the SEC estimated that "the average cost of
achieving initial regulatory compliance for an initial public offering is $2.5
million, followed by an ongoing compliance cost, once public, of $1.5
million per year." 29 Even on smaller registrations, "[a]ccounting, legal and
other expenses . . . can easily exceed $50,000."30
These high costs are in tension with the "widely recognized [idea] that
small businesses are an important part of the U.S. economy and that there is
a value in encouraging small businesses to get started."31 In recognition of
this value, Congress and the SEC have created exemptions from SEC
registration. These exemptions retain the emphasis on investor protection,
but impose fewer restrictions in certain cases, such as when investors are
considered capable of protecting themselves. The federal exemptions, as
well as many state registration exemptions, distinguish between accredited
and non-accredited investors. An accredited investor includes: (1) certain
institutional investors, such as banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies,
and investment companies; (2) corporations or trusts with total assets in
excess of $5,000,000; (3) any director, executive officer, or general partner
of the issuer; (4) any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited
investors; (5) any natural person whose net worth exceeds $1,000,000; or
(6) any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000
in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's
spouse in excess of $300,000 for those years.3 2 Companies are often
subject to fewer restrictions when securities are sold exclusively or mainly
to accredited investors. Section 4(a)(5), for example, exempts offerings
and sales of securities made exclusively to accredited investors if the total
offering price is less than $5 million.3 3
28. Hazen, supra note 19, at 1744; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small
Businesses'Search for "A Moderate Capital", 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 91-92 (2006).
29. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, Exchange Act Release No.
34-70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,509 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (citing IPO TASK FORCE,
REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP 9 (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/acsec/rebuilding the ipo on-ramp.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8K4-74LG]).
30. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879, 909 (2011) (quoting
Campbell, Jr., supra note 28, at 90).
31. Hazen, supra note 19, at 1744.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2014). Either the individual's net worth or joint net worth
with that individual's spouse may be used. Id. § 230.215(e) (providing further detail on how
to calculate net worth).
33. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C § 77d(a)(5) (2012); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b)(1); see also Small Business and the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#rega [https://perma.cc/SS4R-27TR] (last
modified Feb. 27, 2014).
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The most common registration exemptions are those for private
offerings, offerings of limited size, intrastate offerings, and securities of
municipal, state, and federal governments.3 4 The section 4(a)(2) private
offering exemption simply provides that "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering" do not need to comply with the federal
registration requirements." Since this brief provision does not provide
issuers with much guidance, Regulation D provides safe harbors, which, if
met, can ensure that an issue will be considered private and thus exempt
from registration.36 The first Regulation D safe harbor is Rule 504, which
exempts some companies that offer and sell less than $1,000,000 of their
securities within a twelve-month period.37 Rule 504 does not restrict the
total number of investors, and general solicitation is only permitted when
certain conditions are met. Rule 505 permits a company to sell up to
$5,000,000 of its securities in any twelve-month period to an unlimited
number of accredited investors and up to thirty-five other persons, provided
there is no general solicitation or advertising and other disclosure
requirements are met.3 9
There are two exemptions under Rule 506.40 The first, Rule 506(b),
provides that a company may be exempt so long as no general solicitation
or advertising is used to market the securities, the securities are sold to
thirty-five or fewer sophisticated, non-accredited investors (although the
securities may be sold to an unlimited number of accredited investors), and
certain disclosure and financial statement requirements are met.4 1 Under
Rule 506(c), a company may use broad solicitation and advertising in the
offering if all investors are accredited and the company has taken
34. Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm [https://perma.cc/DS4H-3QLK] (last modified
Sept. 2, 2011).
35. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.508 (2014); see also Regulation D Offerings, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm [https://perma.cc/4QEY-
R46P] (last modified Oct. 28, 2014).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2014); see also Rule 504 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule504.htm [https://perma.cc/E2RR-
4FVA] (last modified Oct. 27, 2014).
3 8. Id.
39. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2014); see also Rule 505 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm [https://perma.cc/LZ7R-
AMWL] (last modified Oct. 27, 2014).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2014); see also Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm [https://perma.cc/T55Q-
Z4K4] (last modified Oct. 6, 2014).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b); see also Rule 506 ofRegulation D, supra note 40.
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reasonable steps to verify the investors are accredited.42 Neither rule,
however, restricts the total amount that a company can raise in the exempt
offering.43 Under Regulation A, on the other hand, small offerings of
securities up to five million dollars within a twelve-month period are
exempt from registration.44
The intrastate offering exemption is perhaps most important to the
state crowdfunding exemptions, as many state exemptions rely on it to
avoid federal registration requirements.45 To qualify for this exemption, a
company must be registered in the applicable state, carry out a significant
amount of its business in that state, and make offers and sales of the
securities only to residents of that state.46 Rule 147 provides guidance to
help ensure that a company meets these requirements. 7
The SEC also imposes restrictions on the number of shareholders that
a company can have without registering. The JOBS Act, discussed in more
detail below, increased this number from 500 to 2,000 shareholders of
record, provided that not more than 499 of those shareholders are
non-accredited investors.48 Though a large number, this restriction is
significant in the context of crowdfunding, which, by definition, relies on a
large number of investors for success.
Finally, states also have their own regulatory schemes governing
securities, known as Blue Sky Laws.4 9 These laws are in addition to the
federal laws, and companies must comply with registration requirements of
both. State securities and registration laws can add even more costs to the
registration process and, in order for a company to be fully exempt from
state and federal registration, it must fit into exemptions in both schemes.
II. BACKGROUND OF CROWDFUNDING
Due to the transaction costs and burdens of SEC registration, many
small companies and startups are forced to pursue funding through other
42. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c); see also Rule 506 ofRegulation D, supra note 40.
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b); see also Rule 506 ofRegulation D, supra note 40.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251; see also Small Business and the SEC, supra note 33.
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)b (Supp. 2015) (providing that the
crowdfunding exemption is available to companies that "meet the requirements of the
federal exemption for intrastate offerings in section 3(a)(1 1)").
46. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)( 1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012); see also Small
Business and the SEC, supra note 33.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2014).
48. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act § 501, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306, 325 (2012).
49. Id.
2016] 275
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means. However, other common sources of capital, such as bank lending
and retained earnings, are often also unavailable for these types of
companies. In response to this funding void, crowdfunding has emerged
as an alternative form of financing for small businesses and start-up
companies.5 Rather than rely on wealthy investors or financial
institutions, crowdfunding is instead based on the idea that a company can
raise money by accepting small investments from a large number of
people-the crowd. 52  Though the term "crowdfunding" is new,53 the
theory behind it is not, and most forms of traditional fundraising resemble
crowdfunding.5 4
While crowdfunding is generally done over the internet,5 5 it could
feasibly be completed through other means as well. However, use of the
internet has significant benefits over other means in the crowdfunding
context: it is inexpensive, instantaneous, and able to reach a far greater
56geographic scope than in-person or mail solicitation. As a result of these
benefits and the previous success of online crowdfunding campaigns,57 it
seems likely that most crowdfunding campaigns will be completed via the
internet in the future and thus the remainder of this Article will focus on
online crowdfunding.58 The following sections briefly survey the various
types of crowdfunding, followed by a comparison of the purported benefits
and disadvantages of crowdfunding.
50. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 1, 5 (2012).
5 1. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 11 (citing KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION
66 (2010)) (noting that the first use of the term "crowdfunding" was in 2006).
54. Id. at 11 (comparing politicians' campaign finances to crowdfunding).
55. Title III: Equity & Debt Crowdfunding, NAT'L CROWDFUNDING Ass'N,
http://www.nlcfa.org/#!equity-crowdfunding/cldq [https://perma.cc/2QFM-ZDFV?type
=image] (last visited May 10, 2016) ("For startup companies looking to raise debt or equity
from the sale of securities, crowdfunding refers to raising such funds, primarily over the
internet, in smaller amounts from a larger pool of investors [through] intermediaries.").
56. See id; Sang Lee, 5 Benefits of Raising Capital Online Through Equity
Crowdfunding, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sang-lee/5-benefits-of-
raising-cap_b_5669144.html [https://perma.cc/B9NZ-7Q3R] (last updated Oct. 12, 2014).
57. See Crowdfunding 101, NAT'L CROWDFUNDING Ass'N, http://www.nlcfa.
org/#!crowdfunding-101/ch6q [https://perma.cc/FMC6-G59G] (last visited May 10, 2016);
Tanya Prive, What is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy?, FORBES (Nov.
27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowd
funding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/5JLU-K9MZ].
58. As discussed below, many of the state crowdfunding exemptions are designed to be
used via internet offerings. See infra Part IV.
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A. Types of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding can take various forms depending on what the crowd
receives in exchange for its contributions.5 9 Reward-based crowdfunding is
perhaps the most popular, or at least the most familiar, form.6 0  In this
model, an investor contributes funds and, in exchange, is promised a
pre-determined reward, such as the product the fundraising-company is
manufacturing or some other small token.6 1 Popular websites like
Kickstarter or Indiegogo typically operate on this model. 62 Although the
reward could be a right or other intangible benefit (such as the right to
purchase the product at a discounted price), the reward is not a financial
return or other interest that would resemble a security, and thus these types
of campaigns are not subject to securities regulation.63
The second form of crowdfunding, known as debt crowdfunding or
peer-to-peer lending, occurs when individuals provide debt financing to a
company or individual with the expectation that their funds will be returned
to them, sometimes with or without interest. 64 When receiving interest, and
thus a profit, on the loan made, the transaction resembles a security and
thus might be subject to securities registration in some situations.6 5
There are also instances of donation crowdfunding, where the donor
simply makes a charitable donation to a project with no expectation of
66
anything in return.66 There are a number of websites that make this type of
67funding available to individuals and companies. While most of these
involve donations to charitable and non-profit institutions, for-profit
entities can also receive funds in this way. 6 8 Again, since donors do not
59. The Ultimate Crowdfunding Guide, CROWDFUND INSIDER, http://www.crowdfund
insider.com/the-ultimate-crowdfunding-guide/ [https://perma.cc/7VPQ-BZWC] (last visited
May 10, 2016).
60. Id.
61. See Bradford, supra note 50, at 16. Bradford treats this category as two types of
crowdfunding: reward crowdfunding and pre-purchase crowdfunding. Id
62. See KiCKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/?ref-nav [https://perma.cc/84L8-
TKP4] (last visited May 10, 2016); INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com
[https://perma.cc/2RXR-5AHH] (last visited May 10, 2016).
63. See Bradford, supra note 50, at 16-17.
64. Id. at 20-22; see also How Does an Online Credit Marketplace Work?, LENDING
CLUB, https://www.lendingelub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action [https://perma.
cc/7KX3-7NPG] (last visited May 10, 2016).
65. See Bradford, supra note 50, at 35-41 (discussing factors affecting whether debt
crowdfunding would be subject to securities registration laws).
66. Id. at 15.
67. See, e.g., GLOBAL GIVING, www.globalgiving.org [https://perma.cc/Z9ER-ZZ5V]
(last visited May 10, 2016).
68. See Bradford, supra note 50, at 15.
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receive anything in exchange for their donations, there are no securities and
thus no registration requirements as a result of organizations receiving
funding in this manner.
The final form of crowdfunding, and emphasis of this Article, is
equity crowdfunding. "Equity crowdfunding offers investors a share of the
profits or return of the business they are helping to fund." 6 9 Although a
significant number of crowdfunding sites worldwide offer stock to
investors,70 these sites are less popular in the United States due to the
security registration issues they raise.n It is clear that the incentive offered
to investors under this model meets the Howey definition of a security72
and, therefore, these types of crowdfunding campaigns must meet SEC
requirements, either by registering or fitting into an applicable exemption.
A number of crowdfunding sites restricted to accredited investors are in
operation in the United States, 73 and some states with crowdfunding
exemptions also have crowdfunding sites in place.74
Despite the differences in these various forms of crowdfunding, they
present many of the same advantages and disadvantages to those seeking
funding and those seeking to contribute. But, as the focus of this Article
and the only form of crowdfunding not yet widely accepted in the United
States, the following discussion focuses on those advantages and
disadvantages most relevant to equity crowdfunding.
B. Benefits of Crowdfunding
Although equity crowdfunding remains largely untested in the United
States, its proponents often cite the success of the other types of
crowdfunding as evidence of its promise as a viable source of funding for
companies that might otherwise struggle to raise capital. "Finding funding
is particularly difficult for businesses seeking to raise funds in the $100,000
to $5 million range."" For example, start-up companies lack earnings and
other indicators of success, making it difficult to receive investments, and
they may not have the collateral needed to obtain bank loans. Likewise,
69. Id. at 24.
70. See, e.g., SEEDRS, https://www.seedrs.com [https://perma.cc/48E4-ZGK8] (last
visited May 10, 2016) (U.K.-based equity crowdfunding platform).
71. See Bradford, supra note 50, at 24.
72. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
73. See, e.g., ANGEL LIST, https://angel.co/ [https://perma.cc/9KZH-J8MZ] (last visited
May 10, 2016).
74. See, e.g., TRUCROWD TEXAS, https://texas.trucrowd.com [https://penna.cc/X6ZL-
SBXX] (last visited May 10, 2016).
75. Bradford, supra note 50, at 100.
76. Id. at 102.
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many small and local businesses may lack the resources to pursue
significant outside investments. In fact, one study found that, of the over
500,000 start-up companies launched each month in the United States, only
0.91% are funded by angel investors and only 0.05% are funded by venture
capital.n Instead, most startups are funded through friends and family
(38% of startups) and personal savings and credit (57% of startups).78
Proponents of crowdfunding regard it as a means to take advantage of this
trend by allowing companies to receive more money from those groups that
already invest in them.
A crowdfunding exemption would not only increase the capital that
can be raised from those that a business-owner personally knows, but also
through anyone with access to the online funding portal. "Most people
seeking to fund businesses and projects, especially younger entrepreneurs,
do not have relationships with enough entities and individuals to create a
stable source of venture capital without third-party assistance."79 Use of
the internet helps to solve this problem by removing the geographic barriers
that small or local companies face in obtaining funding.so This is
particularly important since "major sources . .. tend to be concentrated in
certain [geographic regions], such as Silicon Valley."' Some also believe
that online crowdfunding not only allows a company to reach more
investors, but specifically enables it to reach investors who previously were
not involved in business funding, allowing companies to access an
"untapped source of small business capital."82
Since small businesses and start-up companies already play a vital role
in the U.S. economy, facilitating funding to these companies is likely to
have a positive effect on the economy through job creation and economic
growth. Small businesses employ over half of the country's private
workforce,84 but they nevertheless struggle to obtain necessary capital.
77. Laura Entis, Where Startup Funding Really Comes From (Infographic),
ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/230011 [https://
perma.cc/T3KF-HWKL]. Although venture capital firms fund such a small amount of
start-up companies, they actually contribute the most dollars to start-up companies because
their investments are so large. See id.
7 8. Id.
79. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 931.
80. See Nate Nead, 5 Reasons Why Investors Are Getting Sucked Into Crowdfunding,
CROWDFUND, http://crowdfund.co/5-reasons-why-investors-are-getting-sucked-into-crowd
funding/ [https://perma.cc/6XR4-H99A] (last visited May 10, 2016).
81. Bradford, supra note 50, at 101.
82. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 931.
83. Small Business, Big Impact!, supra note 2.
84. Fast Facts on Small Business, HouSE COMM. ON SMALL Bus.,
http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/april-recess-small-biz-talking-pts.pdf
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Crowdfunding may help to "generate the capital small businesses need to
commence or continue operations, which in turn, fuels economic growth."85
Some also believe that crowdfunding will actually increase
information in the marketplace, both for companies and investors. From
the company's perspective, crowdfunding provides a form of market-based
research, allowing owners to gauge the public's response to a new product
prior to production.86 This enables companies to determine the likelihood
of success and make improvements before significant funds are used.8 7
While this is certainly more relevant in the consumer goods context,
crowdfunding can still be a viable source of information for young
companies in other contexts. Crowdfunding, especially when solicited
online, provides a relatively inexpensive method to determine a venture's
appeal to investors.88 From the investor's perspective, crowdfunding leads
to increased information as the use of the internet increases the "knowledge
of the crowd" and helps individual investors to make wiser investment
decisions.89
In addition to increasing the potential to raise funds, crowdfunding
also enables companies to avoid the high costs of SEC registration in that it
involves lower costs than traditional securities offerings.90 The costs of
SEC registration are generally not proportional to the size of the offering,91
so even companies that only seek to raise a small amount of capital bear
[http://perma.cc/8KD7-27YB] (last visited May 10, 2016). Because the SBA has such an
expansive definition of a small business, including "an independent business having fewer
than 500 employees," this statistic likely includes businesses that most people would not
think of as "small." Id.
85. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 932.
86. KRISTOF DE BUYSERE ET AL., A FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING 10
(2012), http://www.europecrowdfunding.org/files/2013/06/FRAMEWORKEU
CROWDFUNDING.pdf [http://perma.cc/GC8M-AJZC] (referring to pre-sales
crowdfunding to measure demand).
87. Id.
88. Although many crowdfunding portals do charge fees to list projects for investment,
many charge based on the amount of funds raised, attempting to make costs proportional to
offering size. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions from Entrepreneurs: How Much Does
it Cost To Be Listed on CircleUp?, CIRCLEUP, https://circleup.com/entrepreneur-
education/faq/#faql28 [https://perma.cc/5NTX-Q6NL] (last visited May 10, 2016)
("CircleUp will generally assess a commission based on a percentage of the total amount
raised.").
89. John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act's Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and
Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 357, 374-401 (2013) (discussing the
importance of the wisdom of the crowd in crowdfunding campaigns).
90. Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1457,
1467 (2013).
91. Campbell, Jr., supra note 28, at 91-92.
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substantial costs to do so through traditional means. Although
crowdfunding sites often charge fees for companies to use them, they are
often based on the amount of money raised or number of contributors,
allowing smaller companies to spend less. 92 Finally, because registration
laws are often complicated and unfamiliar to the general public, many
companies that violate them do so unknowingly. Crowdfunding has been
considered a compromise by regulators to provide a sort of safe harbor for
companies that need to raise funds and have investors willing to do so.94
In response to concerns of fraud, proponents of crowdfunding often
point to the lack of fraud in existing forms of crowdfunding-both
rewards-based crowdfunding in the United States and equity crowdfunding
in countries that currently allow it.9 5 However, in spite of these benefits
and the purported success in existing campaigns, many remain skeptical
about the potential for crowdfunding.
C. Concerns with Crowdfunding
A major concern with crowdfunding, and particularly a new
exemption targeting small-scale investors, is the risk of fraud. The
utilization of online platforms for crowdfunding campaigns increases this
risk, as promoters and issuers of crowdfunding campaigns are able to hide
behind the anonymity of the internet.96 Internet crowdfunding "may be less
transparent and more intangible to investors and regulators" 9 7 due in part to
92. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions from Entrepreneurs, supra note 88
("CircleUp will generally assess a commission based on a percentage of the total amount
raised.").
93. See, e.g., Joseph M. Campos, You Don't Have To Know the Securities Laws To Be
Criminally Guilty of a Willful Violation, COMPANYCOUNSEL.NET (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://companycounsel.net/2010/01/21/you-dont-have-to-know-the-securities-laws-to-be-
criminally-guilty-of-a-willful-violation/ [http://perma.cc/9BCK-3ZWM].
94. See Jaime Brockway, The State that Paved the Way for Equity-based
Crowdfunding, BEACON (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:08 PM), https://www.beaconreader.com/jaime-
brockway/the-state-that-paved-the-way-for-equity-based-crowdfunding [http://perma.cc/
PB6D-V67C] (discussing how the drafter of the Kansas crowdfunding exemption wrote the
bill after "witnessing several small businesses 'accidentally' violate the registration
exemption under which they were operating").
95. Jason Best & Sherwood Neiss, Crowdfunding Delayed Again, Blasted as a 'Top
Danger', VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/
08/22/crowdfunding-delayed-again-blasted-as-a-top-danger/ [http://perma.cc/DD7N-N6XV]
(noting the lack of fraud in the U.K. and Australia, as well as a scam on Kickstarter that was
shut down).
96. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 933; Hazen, supra note 19, at 1769
("[S]ocial media technologies increase rather than decrease the potential for fraud.").
97. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 933.
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the "fast-moving markets" of the internet, where prices can lag and
investors can quickly suffer unexpected losses. 98 The ability to use the
internet for little or even no cost and still reach a wide scope of people
makes fraud even easier.99  Considering these factors and the general
difficulty in regulating the internet, it is not surprising that the internet is a
"common vehicle for securities fraud." 00 And further adding to this
concern of fraud is that small businesses, the companies most likely to use
a crowdfunding exemption, "may be disproportionately involved in
securities fraud." 10
At least one scholar has also expressed concern that, despite this
increased risk of fraud, private enforcement of anti-fraud and other
regulations would be lacking in the crowdfunding context. 10 2  Because
crowdfunding involves so many investors, each with such a small financial
stake, these investors are unlikely to sue crowdfunding promoters for fraud
or inadequate disclosure or pricing. 103 For each individual investor, the
costs of an attorney may very well be more than the amount he or she
contributed to a crowdfunding campaign.' 04  Further, some believe that
these small dollar amounts will also make class action suits impractical,
since the total amount recoverable will also be a small amount. 05  If
investors are less likely to take action, it is not clear how cases of
wrongdoing would attract the attention of regulators either.1 0 6 The SEC
must already prioritize its enforcement actions and often does so based on
factors such as the number of investors harmed or the message such
enforcement would send to the public. 0 7  Thus, it seems unlikely that
crowdfunding campaigns would be the large-scale, high profile cases
targeted by public regulators.
98. Tips for Online Investing, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/onlinetips.htm [http://perma.cc/8WQ6-DXU9] (last
modified Aug. 1, 2007).
99. Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 58 (1998).
100. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 935.
101. Id. at 935-36.
102. See Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding 's Curious Conundrum, 7
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 373 (2012).
103. Id. at 415-16.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 416-18 (arguing that the dollar cap for crowdfunding offerings would result
in limited damages awards which would not justify the attorneys' fees involved in such a
suit); see also, infra Part IV-2 (discussing existing limits on the total amount that a company
can raise in a crowdfunding campaign).
106. Palmiter, supra note 102, at 418-20.
107. Id. at 418-19.
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Further, many believe that the general public lacks sufficient financial
knowledge to wisely invest in crowdfunding campaigns. 08 Crowdfunding
provides people with the opportunity to invest in companies without
consulting experts and with limited information about a company or its
managers. The SEC has warned that, "[a]lthough online trading saves
investors time and money .. . making wise investment decisions takes
time." 09 Even if adequate information is available to investors, there is
concern that it will be disregarded because of the ease with which
purchases and trades can occur. Further, the SEC recently conducted a
study finding that "U.S. retail investors [generally] lack basic financial
literacy.""o Combining this investor illiteracy with easier trading makes
crowdfunding an especially risky environment.
Adding to this risk is the fact that "[c]ompanies with small
capitalizations present disproportionate risks of . .. business failure." 1 '
This increased rate of failure means that investors are likely to lose all of
their investment in many cases.11 2 There are also concerns with the pricing
of securities in crowdfunding campaigns, since there are no underwriters or
institutional investors negotiating the offering price.1
Although the concerns regarding crowdfunding are undoubtedly
serious, none of them appear to be insurmountable. In fact, concerns of
fraud and mispricing could be resolved, or at least mitigated, if
crowdfunding is properly regulated to address those issues. Enforcement
does pose unique challenges, as ineffective enforcement would render the
most-stringent regulations ineffective. However, state-level regulators may
actually be in a better position to monitor crowdfunding raises since the
issuers and investors will be confined to a smaller geographic region to
monitor. And, through regulation of funding portals, states can impose an
additional monitoring device on issuers by forcing portals to oversee the
companies that use them.
Further, the increased risks associated with small business investment
should not cause regulators to "ban, thwart, or unduly constrain securities
offerings by small business issuers," 1 4 especially if the benefits of small
businesses are as substantial as generally thought. Instead, the increased
108. See, e.g., id. at 413.
109. Tips for Online Investing, supra note 98.
110. U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG
INVESTORS iii (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-
partl .pdf [https://perma.cc/49TH-EU69].
111. Fisch, supra note 99, at 58.
112. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 933-34.
113. Palmiter, supra note 102, at 390.
114. Heminway & Hoffian, supra note 30, at 936.
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risks of small businesses investments should lead to increased investor
education and company regulation so that companies and the economy can
experience the benefits of an increase in capital availability.
In conclusion, the disadvantages of crowdfunding, though significant,
can be reduced through proper regulation. Rather than prohibit
crowdfunding entirely, this Article suggests altering existing crowdfunding
schemes to mitigate these problems, while still permitting companies and
the economy to experience the benefits of crowdfunding.
III. EARLY CROWDFUNDING EXEMPTIONS FROM SECURITIES REGULATION
Considering the success of reward-based crowdfunding and small
businesses' difficulty in capital-raising, it is not surprising that many
groups began to call for and suggest legal changes that would enable equity
crowdfunding to meet small businesses' financing needs. In 2010, the
Sustainable Economies Law Center (SELC) petitioned the SEC to create a
registration exemption for "'any low-risk public ownership of locally
owned microbusinesses."" 15 Other organizations and legal scholars also
suggested a number of proposals for small business crowdfunding
116exemptions.
Many of the early crowdfunding exemption proposals were modest.11 7
The SELC proposal, for example, suggested limiting exempt investments to
only $100 per investor, based on the belief that, by limiting any investor to
only $100, such an investment would be low-risk."' One scholar
suggested an investor limit of $1,000 per six-month
period" 9-significantly more, but still intended to limit the maximum loss.
Companies were also subject to strict limits on how much they could raise
under these early proposals: one proposal suggested limiting companies to
115. SELC and the CROWDFUND Act, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR.,
http://www.theselc.org/selc-and-the-crowdfund-act [http://perma.cc/DP9Y-VR8M] (last
visited May 10, 2016) ("By low-risk, I mean that no person can hold more than $100 worth
of any one stock. By local ownership, I mean that only residents within a state can buy,
hold, and sell stock shares. And by microbusinesses, I mean any business with a total stock
valuation on issuance of less than $250,000." (quoting Michael Shuman, Local Stock
Exchanges and National Stimulus, 5 COMMUNITY DEV. INv. REv. 81, 83 (2009))).
116. See Hazen, supra note 19, at 1750-51 (citing Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding
Microstartups: It's Time for the Securities and Exchange Commission To Approve a Small
Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 973, 1000-01 (2011)) (describing proposals);
Bradford, supra note 50.
117. See, e.g., SELC and the CROWDFUND Act, supra note 115.
118. Id.
119. Pope, supra note 116, at 1000-01.
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only raising $250,000 per year, 12 0 while another suggested $250,000 per
six-month period.12 1 The SELC proposal effectively imposed a company
limit through the "microbusiness" requirement, which requires that the
business have a total stock valuation on issuance of less than $250,000.122
These proposals are much smaller in scope than those eventually passed,
both from the investor and company's perspective. However, the proposals
nevertheless laid a foundation for, and perhaps inspired, the federal and
state exemptions.123
With this background, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (JOBS Act) in 2012 to facilitate the availability of capital for
small businesses. 124 Among other things, the JOBS Act created a new
classification of "emerging" companies, which are those that have under $1
billion in revenue, under $1 billion in nonconvertible debt, and are not
registered with the SEC as a large accredited filer.1 2 5 Title III of the JOBS
Act, the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical
Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act), created a new SEC
registration exemption for these emerging companies.1 2 6  It allows
emerging companies to raise up to one million dollars annually from
non-accredited investors, with the total amount depending on the level of
financial disclosures provided.1 2 7 The CROWDFUND Act also limits the
amount that an issuer can accept from any single investor annually: for
investors with a net worth less than $100,000, the issuer may only sell
securities aggregately valued at "the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the
annual income or net worth of such investor," and if an investor's net worth
is greater than or equal to $100,000, then the issuer may sell securities
120. Bradford, supra note 50, at 91-93.
121. Pope, supra note 116, at 1000-01.
122. SELC and the CROWDFUND Act, supra note 115.
123. Id. ("The Sustainable Economies Law Center played a key role in initiating the
campaign for the CROWDFUND Act.. . ."); Exemption Framework, STARTUP EXEMPTION,
http://www.startupexemption.com/exemption-framework#axzz3XTOjGJbA
[http://perma.cc/UJS9-3XJJ] (last updated Oct. 27, 2011) (describing Startup Exemption's
proposed crowdfunding framework).
124. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
125. Id. § 101(a).
126. Id. § 301.
127. Id. § 302(a). "For example, the full $1 million is available to companies only if
their financial statements are audited by an independent public accountant, whereas a
company may raise under $100,000 by providing little more than an income tax statement
and unaudited financials." James J. Williamson, Comment, The JOBS Act and
Middle-Income Investors: Why It Doesn't Go Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2074 (2013)
(discussing Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act § 302(a)-(b)).
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aggregately valued at "10 percent of the annual income or net worth . .. not
to exceed a maximum aggregate amount sold of $100,000."l128 In many
ways, the exemption is similar to previously existing exemptions that are
limited to use by companies below certain thresholds.
The CROWDFUND exemption also requires that all offerings be
conducted through third-party intermediaries registered as either a broker
or funding portal, pursuant to section 4A(a).1 2 9 Intermediaries must register
with the SEC, 130 as well as with a self-regulatory organization that assists
the SEC in overseeing security transaction activities.131  Though brokers
and funding portals both facilitate securities transactions, there are
significant differences in the regulation and permitted activities for each. 13 2
However, both types of intermediaries are able to facilitate transactions via
the internet. 13 3
While many were hopeful that the CROWDFUND Act "would
provide startup companies and other small businesses with a new way to
raise capital from ordinary investors in a more transparent and regulated
marketplace,"l 34 the exemption is yet to be used due to the SEC's delay in
issuing final rules. The JOBS Act imposed a December 31, 2012 deadline
for the SEC to enact rules implementing the exemption, but the SEC did
128. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act § 302(a).
129. Id. § 302(a), 304(b).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1) (2012).
131. Id. § 77d-1(a)(2).
132. A Broker is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012). A funding portal, on
the other hand, includes "any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the
offer or sale of securities." Id. § 78c(a)(80). Funding portals are more limited in the
activities they may do. They do not:
(A) offer investment advice or recommendations;
(B) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered or displayed on
its website or portal;
(C) compensate employees, agents, or other persons for such solicitation or based
on the sale of securities displayed or referenced on its website or portal;
(D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or
(E) engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines
appropriate.
Id.
133. For a more in-depth look at funding portals and broker dealers under the
CROWDFUND Act, see Shekhar Darke, Note, To Be or Not To Be a Funding Portal: Why
Crowdfunding Platforms Will Become Broker-Dealers, 10 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 183, 193
(2014).
134. 157 Cong. Rec. S188, 8458 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Merkley).
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not issue notice of a proposed rulemaking until November 2013135 and the
final rules were not issued until October 30, 2015.136 While the rules, titled
"Regulation Crowdfunding," mean that interstate crowdfunding will soon
be a reality, the rules did not become effective until May of 2016.137 Until
the rules take effect (and perhaps longer, as companies and regulators adapt
to the new rules), crowdfunders will have to continue utilizing state
exemptions in order to raise capital in this way.
IV. STATE EXEMPTIONS
Perhaps inspired by the CROWDFUND Act or frustrated by the
SEC's delay, many states have implemented their own crowdfunding
exemptions from state security registration laws.'3 8 To date, twenty-eight
states have passed crowdfunding exemptions,139 while numerous others are
135. Rules Governing the Offer and Sale of Securities Through Crowdfunding Under
Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd=20141 0&RIN=3235-AL37 [http://perma.cc/MQ4N-
TEN3] (last visited May 17, 2016).
136. See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9974, Exchange Act Release No.
34-76324, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387 (proposed Nov. 16, 2015); see also Press Release, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N., SEC Adopts Rules To Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [http://perma.cc/GZN3-GZ63].
137. See id; see also Client Alert: Regulation Crowdfunding, WYRICK (Wyrick,
Robbins, Yates & Ponton, LLP, Raleigh, N.C.), (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.wyrick.com/
documents/newsPdfs/ClientAlertRegulationCrowdfunding.pdf [http://perma.cc/7WSU-2P
EP].
138. Kansas, for example, passed its crowdfunding exemption prior to JOBS Act in
2011. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (Supp. 2015).
139. The twenty-eight states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 8-6-1 (a)(14) (Supp.
2015); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1844(D) (Supp. 2015); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 11-51-304(6) (2015); COLO. CODE REGS. § 51-3.3 (2015); Florida, H.B. 275, 2015
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015); Georgia, GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 590-4-2-.08 (2012); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE § 30-14-203 (2013); Illinois, H.B. 3429, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2015).; Indiana, IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2015); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 502.202, 502.605
(2015); Kansas, KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2016); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 292.410-.415 (West 2015); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A (2015);
Maryland, MD. CODE. ANN., CORPs. & Ass'NS § 11-601(16) (LexisNexis 2014);
Massachusetts, 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 451.2202(y) (Supp. 2015); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 80A.461 (2014); Mississippi,
1-14 Miss. CODE R. §§ 2.04, 7.21 (LexisNexis 2015); Montana, MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 30-10-105 (West 2015); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT.§ 8-1111 (2015) (as amended by L.B.
226, 104th Leg., First Sess. (Neb. 2015)); New Jersey, S.B. 712, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.J. 2014); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 59.035 (2013) (and related regulations); South
Carolina, H.B. 3088, 2015 Leg., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2015); Tennessee, TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 48-1-103(a)(13) (Supp. 2012); Texas, 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 139.25 (2015); Vermont,
21-030 VT. CODE R. § 007 (2015); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514 (2011);
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considering such exemptions. Due to the changing landscape of state
crowdfunding exemptions, this Article focuses on a limited number of
existing state exemptions, rather than surveying all proposed or passed state
exemptions. This Part surveys fifteen of the existing state crowdfunding
exemptions, looking first at the general requirements that many exemptions
have in common, then turning to the more specific, substantive restrictions
that dictate the size and scope of exempt offerings.
One general requirement that all states share is that, in order to utilize
the state exemption, the crowdfund offering must also meet the
requirements of a federal exemption to avoid triggering any federal
registration requirements.1 40  In most states, the intrastate offering
exemption of section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act is the chosen
exemption.141 Therefore, in addition to the state's crowdfunding exemption
requirements, a company must also meet the requirements of 3(a)(l 1): the
company must be registered and carry out a significant amount of its
business in that state and the company can only offer and sell securities to
residents of that state.1 4 2 Although these requirements are implicit through
reference to the intrastate offering exemption, most states nevertheless
explicitly have these requirements listed in the crowdfunding exemption.1 4 3
Maine requires an offering to fit the exemption requirements of Rule 504 of
Regulation D, allowing a company to raise up to one million dollars
annually, but the effect-exemption from federal registration-is the
same.144
Further, most states also require companies utilizing the exemption to
file a notice with the state's securities commissioner (or equivalent
office).1 45 Although companies are able to avoid the time and expense of
traditional registration, the state still requires some form of notice about a
company's capital raising.1 46  Generally, this notice simply requires the
company to claim the exemption and provide relevant background
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880 (2014); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 551.202
(2013-14); see also Michael Davidson, Colorado Lawmakers Set Stage for Equity
Crowdfunding, XCONOMY (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.xconomy.com/boulder-denver/
2015/02/25/colorado-lawmakers-set-stage-for-equity-crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/P9JY-
3LCB]. Due to this uncertainty, Colorado's exemption is disregarded for the remainder of
this Article.
140. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 590-4-2-.08(1)(b).
141. See, e.g., id Maine relies on Rule 504 of Regulation D instead. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A(D).
142. Small Business and the SEC: Intrastate Offering Exemption, supra note 33.
143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14).
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A(D).
145. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(y) (Supp. 2015).
146. Id
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information about the company, such as its address, owners, and the
depository institution that will hold investor funds. 14 7  Some states also
require that companies provide recent financial statements 4 8 or the targeted
minimum and maximum amounts to be raised in the offering.'49  While
these notice filings may be time-consuming and often require the payment
of a fee,150 they are undoubtedly less demanding than typical state
registration requirements.
Another common, yet unsurprising, characteristic among the state
exemptions is the applicability to online offerings and sales. Some states
require that the offering be completed exclusively through a website and
provide guidelines on how such a site can be operated.'5 1 Other states do
not explicitly require that offerings be completed online, but show that use
of the internet is permissible, such as Michigan, which permits an issuer to
advertise an offering through a website.1 52 Although some states do not
specifically mention the internet in the statutory exemption, 153 none of the
surveyed statutes forbid use of the internet in the offering.
Apart from these requirements, the state exemptions generally
resemble each other only in form. Most of the exemptions address similar
categories of requirements that determine what crowdfunding will look like
in that particular state. Much like the federal exemption, the state laws
address issues such as how much money is raised, from whom it is raised,
and disclosure requirements. However, the specific limits imposed within
these categories vary greatly across the states.
One notable exception to this general form is Idaho, which permits
crowdfunding in certain circumstances, but does not have a statutory
exemption.1 54 Instead, the availability of crowdfunding is determined on a
case-by-case basis by the Idaho Department of Finance. 55 The Idaho Code
permits a rule or order to exempt a security, transaction, or offer from
147. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A)(v) (Supp. 2012).
148. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A(E)(5).
149. OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0110(2)(d) (updated as of Feb. 15, 2016),
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_400/oar_441/441 035.html [https://perma.cc/
K5ET-RJJH].
150. OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-01 10(1) (imposing a $200 filing fee).
151. See IND. CODE. § 23-19-2-2(27)(0) (2015).
152. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(3) (Supp. 2015).
153. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14) (Supp. 2015).
154. See Peter Clough, These States Won't Wait for the JOBS Act, EARLY INVESTING
(Mar. 27, 2015), http://earlyinvesting.com/jobs-act-these-states-wont-wait/ [http://perma.cc/
V56X-D6J4].
155. IDAHO CODE § 30-14-203 (2013).
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securities registration.156 Although the exemptions are issued in the form
of orders, they often contain requirements that resemble other states'
statutory exemptions, including restrictions on the total amount that can be
raised in the issue and the total amount that can be accepted from a single
investor, as well as other disclosure requirements.157  Due to its unique
exemption form, Idaho is disregarded for the remainder of this Article.
For the remaining states with crowdfunding exemptions, the following
four categories of exemption requirements will be addressed: (1) the annual
investment limit per investor; (2) the annual maximum capital raise per
company; (3) required disclosures to investors; and (4) required investor
certifications or acknowledgements. Following this overview of these
requirements in the states, the next Part will address the deficiencies that
exist in some or all of the states regarding these various requirements.
A. Annual Investment Limit Per Investor
Like the federal exemption, most of the state exemptions impose a
maximum dollar amount that any single investor may annually contribute
to a company's capital raise. This ceiling is designed to limit the exposure
that an investor has to a single company's risk, at least on an annual basis.
Also like the federal exemption, most states distinguish between accredited
and non-accredited investors in limiting the amount of an annual
investment. Nine states adopted the federal definition of "accredited
investor" and none of them impose an annual investment limit on
accredited investors, but instead only restrict a non-accredited investor's
purchase. 1 8 Kansas, one of the first states to enact an exemption, allows
non-accredited investors to invest up to $1,000 annually. 5 9 Four states
impose a $5,000 limit on annual purchases by non-accredited investors,160
while four states double this amount, allowing non-accredited investors to
purchase up to $10,000 in securities from a company annually.1 61
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Treasure Valley Angel Fund, LLC, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,729,
2014 WL 4063439 (Jan. 20, 2012).
158. ALA. CODE § 8-6-1 l(a)(14); GA. COMP. R. & REGs. § 590-4-2-.08(1)(d) (2012); IND.
CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2015); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a)(4) (Supp. 2015); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit 32, § 16304.6-A.C (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(y) (Supp. 2015);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2012); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE.
§ 139.25(e) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 551.202(13) (2013-14).
159. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a)(4).
160. ALA. CODE § 8-6-1 l(a)(14)(d); IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 16304.6-A(C); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 139.25(e).
161. GA. COMP. R. & REGs. § 590-4-2-.08(1)(d); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(y)(iv);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A)(iii); Wis. STAT. § 551.202(26)(d).
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However, a few states do not distinguish between accredited and
non-accredited investors, and instead impose annual investment limits on
all purchasers. Maryland is one such state and, in addition to treating all
investors equally, imposes the lowest annual investment limit of just
$100.162 Washington and Massachusetts likewise abandon the accredited
investor status and instead distinguish investors based on net worth and
annual income.1 6 3 In Washington, investors with a net worth or annual
income less than $100,000 may annually invest the greater of $2,000 or 5%
of his net worth or income,'" while investors whose net worth or annual
income is greater than $100,000 may annually invest up to 10% of net
worth or income (up to a maximum investment of $100,000).165
Massachusetts' exemption imposes almost identical restrictions.1 66
As these numbers show, the annual investor limits vary greatly
between states, ranging from $100 to $10,000 and potentially more in a
state like Washington. With this great disparity, some context is needed to
determine which of these numbers, if any, are reasonable limitations and
what effect they will have on investor contributions. Such context is hard
to develop because there are currently very few opportunities for
non-accredited investors to engage in equity crowdfunding. However,
looking at current crowdfunding trends, one possibility is that these
limitations may not actually matter. In the past, those earning over
$100,000 per year were more likely to invest in startups through
crowdfunding.1 6 7  And one equity crowdfunding platform, CircleUp,
reported that, although the average investment depends on the deal, it is
typically five figures.'68  These numbers are likely skewed due to the
162. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § I 1-601(16)(iv) (LexisNexis 2014).
163. See 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.880 (2014).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880.
165. Id.
166. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.402(B)(13)(o)(5). The only difference between
Massachusetts' and Washington's limits is that Massachusetts imposes the smaller limit if
both net worth and annual income are below certain thresholds, but the larger limit can be
utilized if either annual income or net worth is above a certain threshold. The Washington
statute provides that the lower limit applies if either net worth or annual income is below a
certain threshold, but that the higher limit applies if either net worth or annual income is
above that threshold. Thus, based on the statutory language alone, it is not clear what limit
would be applied to an investor whose net income was below the threshold and annual
income was above the threshold.
167. Crowdfunding Statistics, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/crowdfundingl01/
crowdfunding-statistics [https://perma.cc/XD5K-S9UQ] (last visited May 17, 2016).
168. Ryan Caldbeck, Why an Equity Crowdfunding Site Could Become the Largest
Marketplace in the World, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
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limited opportunities available to non-accredited investors, but they do
indicate important trends: unsurprisingly, people with higher incomes are
more likely to invest, and those people invest significant amounts of money
in the campaigns they support. Therefore, it is very possible that the people
most likely to invest in crowdfunding campaigns will be accredited
investors and, in many states, not be subject to any annual investor limits.
Even for non-accredited investors, the limits may also be irrelevant in
many situations. Since non-accredited investors are able to contribute to
reward-based crowdfunding, the typical contribution to those campaigns
may provide insight on how appropriate the exemption limitations are. In
recent years, the average contribution to these campaigns was estimated to
be between seventy and eighty dollars, 169 and on Kickstarter the most
common contribution was just twenty-five dollars. 170  If these numbers
generally reflect the amount that investors are willing to contribute to new
ventures, then even Maryland's limit of one hundred dollars will not
prevent investors from contributing as much as they would like. In other
states where the limits are thousands of dollars, most investors will not
even approach the maximum contribution amount-thus making such
limits irrelevant to most investors. But reward-based crowdfunding is not a
perfect comparison either, as investors likely limit their contribution to the
perceived value of the reward received, often a consumer good. Investors
may be more willing to contribute more funds in exchange for equity and
the opportunity to receive a more significant financial return.
Campaign finance provides another useful context to compare to these
investment limits. Campaign contributions are donations and thus a
contributor has no expectation of receiving a financial return on his or her
ryancaldbeck/2013/11/11 /why-an-equity-crowdfunding-site-could-become-the-largest-mark
etplace-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/UD5Y-YUT7].
169. Crowdfunding, MARK ALLEN COACHING, http://www.triathlonbusinessintl.com/
assets/files/Crowd%20Funding%2OMark%20AlIen.pdf [http://perma.cc/GCQ2-BFQF]
(average contribution on Kickstarter was $70, with $25 being the most common amount);
Will Haines, Indiegogo Insight: Average Contribution Amount Through Email Is Higher
Than Other Referral Sources, INDIEGOGO (Mar. 22, 2012), https://go.indiegogo.com/
blog/2012/03/indiegogo-insight-average-contribution-amount-through-email-is-higher-than-
other-referral-sources.html [https://perma.cc/RJ9G-5KA7] ("The average contribution
amount in response to a direct email is $90 [whereas] the average contribution in response
to other forms of outreach (i.e. [F]acebook post) is $67."); Crowdfunding Campaigns: Risks
for Startups, MARS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.marsdd.com/mars-library/crowdfunding-
campaigns-risks-for-startups/ [http://perma.cc/R5UP-QRS2] (average contribution is
roughly $70); Scott Thompson, The Average Crowdfunding Contribution Is $80: What That
Means for Platform Owners, CROWDFORCE (Oct. 28, 2012), http://crowdforce.co/average-
crowdfunding-contribution-is-80/ [http://perma.cc/ACC4-HY58] (average was $80 from
2007 to 2012).
170. MARK ALLEN COACHING, supra note 169.
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contribution, apart from some perceived financial benefit from having a
certain candidate elected or policies implemented. In effect, campaign
contributions represent a scenario in which an investor loses all the funds
contributed to a crowdfunding campaign. Interestingly, the government is
more comfortable allowing individuals to spend money with no chance of
return than allowing spending in crowdfunding, where there is at least a
chance of a financial gain, however small it may be. For example, in 2015,
an individual can contribute up to $2,700 per candidate per federal election
(with primaries, runoffs, and general elections each being considered a
separate election).17 1 This number is independent of contributions to PACs
($5,000 per year), to state/district/local party committees ($10,000 per year,
combined), to national party committees ($33,400), and to Additional
National Party Committee Accounts ($100,200 per year). 17 2 States are also
generous in their campaign finance limits: Alabama imposes no limits on
campaign contributions, Georgia allows contributions up to $6,300 to
statewide candidates and $2,500 to legislature candidates per election, and
Maryland even allows contributions of $4,000 per candidate per election
cycle.173  Although campaign finance raises free speech issues that are
generally not present in the investment contextl 74 and has different
objectives than financial investments, these numbers nevertheless show a
major inconsistency in how the government regulates individual spending.
A simple comparison of the investor limits confirms this
inconsistency. States like Massachusetts and Washington limit an investor
to spending either 5% or 10% of annual income on a crowdfunding
investment (depending on income level).' 75  However, the other states
either treat all investors similarly regardless of income, or only distinguish
between those with incomes above and below $200,000. The investment
limits seem arbitrary when the proportion of income that a state allows an
investor to spend is compared: the most common limit, $5,000, for
171. Contributions, FED. ELECTIONS COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
contrib.shtml [http://perma.cc/6HJV-9SL4] (last updated Feb. 2015).
172. Id Additional national party committee accounts refers to "a national party
committee's accounts for: (i) the presidential nominating convention; (ii) election recounts
and contests and other legal proceedings; and (iii) national party headquarters buildings."
Id
173. State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/documents/legismgt/Limits toCandidates_2012-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q4TD-RDAK] (last updated Oct. 2013).
174. See, e.g., How Spending Money Became a Form of Speech, AMEND. GAZETTE
http://www.amendmentgazette.com/how-spending-money-became-a-form-of-speech/
[http://perma.cc/X77Q-LMY2] (last visited Nov. 26, 2015).
175. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 21.20.880(1)(g)(ii) (2014).
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example, only represents 2.5% of a $200,000 income, but 10% of a
$50,000 income. The failure to consider income level beyond the
accredited investor threshold disregards the varying effects that such
investments can have on individuals' finances, despite the intended purpose
behind these limitations: investor protection. These investor limitations
appear even more arbitrary when compared alongside the capital-raising
limitations imposed on companies.
B. Annual Maximum Capital Raise Per Company
The state exemptions also limit the total amount that a company can
annually raise in reliance on a crowdfunding exemption. Like the
numerous other exemptions that impose this limit, it is intended to restrict
the size of the offering. For exemptions that distinguish between
accredited and non-accredited investors, this maximum amount is generally
exclusive of sales to accredited or institutional investors. 17 6  Thus,
companies in some states are able to annually raise more capital than the
exemption's limit, provided such additional financing is obtained from
sources other than non-accredited investors or through capital raises under
other exemptions.
Seven states allow a company to raise up to $1,000,000 annually
under the crowdfunding exemption.177  Indiana, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin alter the maximum raise amount based on the financial
information provided to investors.' 7 8 The Wisconsin statute, for example,
provides that "if the issuer has undergone and made available to each
prospective investor and [state regulators] the documentation resulting
from a financial audit of its most recently completed fiscal year which
complies with generally accepted accounting principles" may receive up to
$2,000,000 annually under the exemption. 179 Issuers that have not made
176. Wis. STAT. § 551.202(26)(c)(1) (2013-2014) (providing that "the sum of all cash
and other consideration to be received for all sales of the security in reliance on the
exemption under this subsection, excluding sales to any accredited investor, certified
investor, or institutional investor, does not exceed the following amount ... .").
177. ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(c) (Supp. 2015); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
§ 590-4-2-.08(1)(c) (2012); KAN. ADMIN. REGs. § 81-5-21(a)(3) (Supp. 2015); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A.B (2015); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A)(ii)
(2012); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 139.25(d) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880(1)(f).
178. Wis. STAT. § 551.202 (26)(c)(1)(a)-(b); IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2015); 950
MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13) (2015).
179. Wis. STAT. § 551.202 (26)(c)(1)(b).
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such an audit available may only receive up to $1,000,000.180 Indiana and
Massachusetts utilize similar language to impose the same annual caps.18 '
Michigan has the highest annual capital raise amounts at
$5,000,000.182 Michigan incorporates this amount by reference to federal
law, so it is subject to further increase in the future.'8 3  Oregon limits
companies to $250,000 per year, 18 4 and again, Maryland is at the
conservative end of the spectrum, limiting a company's annual sales to just
$100,000.185
In addition to capping the maximum amount that can be raised, some
states require that companies reach minimum targets in order to receive any
of the funds raised. Massachusetts, for example, requires a company to
establish a minimum offering amount, which cannot be less than 30% of
the maximum target amount set by the company. 186  The statute then
mandates, "If the minimum offering amount is not met within one year of
the earlier of the commencement of the offering or the first posting of the
offering on the internet, the issuer shall return all funds to investors."' 8 7
Maine likewise requires that all proceeds of the offering remain in a
separate bank account until the minimum offering amount is reached and
that such proceeds be returned to investors if the minimum amount is not
reached within one year.
The annual maximum capital raise is important because it basically
tells a company whether the crowdfunding exemption is the right method to
raise capital. Some companies will require more capital than the maximum
allows and thus a different exemption or registration is a better option for
them. A number of states also specify that the crowdfunding exemption
cannot be used with any other exemptions and, as a result, a company is
restricted by the amount in the crowdfunding exemption, even if new
financing needs arise.
180. Id.
181. IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2015); 950 MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o)
(2015).
182. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(y)(iii) (Supp. 2015).
183. Id.
184. OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0090(6) (updated as of Feb. 15, 2016), http://arcweb.
sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_400/oar_441/441_035.html [https://perma.cc/K5ET-RJJH].
185. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns. § 11-601(16)(iii) (LexisNexis 2014).
186. 950 MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015). The maximum must also be
disclosed to investors in the offering materials. Id.
187. Id.
188. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A.F (2015).
189. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(k) (Supp. 2015); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 48-1-103(a)(13)(B)(i) (2012).
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With maximum capital raises ranging from $100,000 to $5,000,000, it
is difficult to determine what would be a reasonable limit to impose on a
small or new company that can only raise funds from state residents. The
legislative intent behind these restrictions undoubtedly matters: if the limits
were actually intended to be restrictive then they will be much lower than if
they are simply upper limits for extreme circumstances, which most
companies would never approach. However, because each state actually
included such a limit, it seems clear that it was intended to be restrictive in
some way. But, even if states had very different perceptions of what types
of companies would use the exemptions and for what purposes, the large
range in limits indicates that some states may be too restrictive or not
actually restrictive at all.
For comparison, on Kickstarter, "[m]ost successfully funded projects
raise less than $10,000"l90 and, though Indiegogo's statistics are not as
publicly available, it seems clear the average goal reached on Indiegogo is
less than $5,000.191 These numbers may be useful for companies seeking
to use crowdfunding for a single project, as many of those on reward-based
crowdfunding sites are. For these types of companies, the maximum
capital raise limits are likely insignificant because they are sufficiently high
to not interfere with a company's goals.
However, for companies and investors with larger and longer-term
plans, these numbers are likely underestimates of how much capital is
needed. The average size of existing equity-based crowdfunding projects is
much larger than reward-based crowdfunding, with estimates ranging from
$85,000 to over $100,000.1 9 2  As these ranges in estimates show,
determining what is "normal" for crowdfunding campaigns is not easy.
190. Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats [https://perma.cc/U4M
Q-CMSW] (last visited May 17, 2016); see also Matt Ward, Kickstarter vs Indiegogo and
How To Decide for Your Crowdfunding Campaign, ART KiCKSTART (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://artofthekickstart.com/kickstarter-vs-indiegogo-and-how-to-decide-for-your-crowd
funding-campaign/ [http://perma.cc/JJS2-HCGU] (stating that the average successful
Kickstarter campaign raised $6,548).
191. Indiegogo Insight: 87% of Campaigns That Reach Their Goal Exceed It,
INDIEGOGO BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), http://go.indiegogo.com/blog/2011/12/indiegogo-insight-
87-of-campaigns-which-reach-their-goal-exceed-it.html [http://perma.cc/4Z8P-GHWL]
(stating that "the average goal reached on Indiegogo is around $3700"); Ward, supra note
190 (stating that the average successful campaign was $2,250 in 2013).
192. See, e.g., Crowdfunding: One Size Doesn't Fit All, SoMoLEND (July 26, 2012),
http://blog.somolend.com/2012/07/26/crowdfunding-one-size-doesnt-fit-all/ [http://perma.
cc/P9LY-NQLE] ("As of May 2012, the average equity-based crowdfunding project raised
$84,597."); Jonathan Sandlund, Investment Crowdfunding: Average Transaction Sizes,
THECROWDCAFE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/investment-crowdfunding-
average-transaction-size/ [http://perma.cc/2EEJ-BUQF] (estimating that the average equity
crowdfunding campaign raised approximately $112,000).
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One crowdfunding organization compared two different crowdfunding
platforms to show how amounts raised depend on the type of companies
and investors targeted. Seedrs, a U.K. crowdfunding platform available to
all investors and focused on technology startups had a median capital raise
amount of $48,000.193 CircleUp, on the other hand, is a U.S.-based
platform only accessible to accredited investors and focused on
emerging-growth consumer product companies.1 9 4 The median raise on
CircleUp was over $800,000, with campaigns ranging between $500,000 to
$2,300,000.195 Compared with these numbers, many of the states' limits
(particularly those around one million dollars) seem more reasonable and
consistent with allowing companies to raise significant amounts of money,
without becoming too large of an offering.
The annual maximum capital raise also works in conjunction with the
annual limits imposed on individual investors. A company seeking to take
full advantage of a crowdfunding exemption can easily compare the
maximum amount it can annually raise to the maximum amount it can
accept from each investor in order to calculate a target number of investors.
For example, in Georgia, a company can raise up to $1,000,000 through the
crowdfunding exemption and can only accept up to $10,000 from each
non-accredited investor.196 Thus, in order to raise the maximum amount
from the fewest number of investors, a Georgia company would need to
accept $10,000 from one hundred investors, making one hundred the
"target number of investors." For the states with existing exemptions, the
target number of investors ranges from 100 to 1,000 investors. 9 7
In reality this ratio is probably not very useful to companies, which
would ideally plan their crowdfunding campaigns based on their specific
financial needs, the amount of ownership they are willing to give up, and
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. § 590-4-2-.08(1) (2012).
197. Georgia and Oregon have a target number of investors of 100. GA. COMP. R. &
REGS. § 590-4-2-.08(1); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0090 (2015). Alabama, Maine, and Texas
have a target number of investors set at 200. ALA. CODE § 8-6-1 1(a)(14) (Supp. 2015); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A (2015); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 139.25(i)(2) (2015).
Michigan has a target number of 500. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(y)(iv) (Supp. 2015).
Kansas, Maryland, and Tennessee each have target numbers of 1,000. KAN. ADMIN. REGS.
§§ 81-5-21(a)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS. § l1-601(16)(iii)
(LexisNexis 2014); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A) (2012). The remaining
states-Indiana, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin-have varying investor caps (based on
annual income or net worth) or varying maximum capital raise amounts (based on financial
information provided to investors). IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2 (2015); 950 MASS. CODE REGS.
§ 14.402(B)(13) (2015); WiS. STAT. § 551.202 (2013-2014).
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other business considerations. However, for purposes of determining the
attainability of the statutory maximum capital raises, this target number of
investors is useful-it essentially tells a company the size of the crowd
needed to raise as much capital as possible under the exemption. This
target number is exclusive of accredited investors in most states, but is
nevertheless useful since the annual maximum capital raise is also
generally exclusive of accredited investors.
How feasible is it that an unregistered company-likely utilizing a
crowdfunding exemption due to the unavailability of traditional financing
options-will be able to convince one hundred or more non-accredited
investors to contribute to their company? This answer seems to range from
unlikely to impossible. For example, on CircleUp, the average deal
involves fewer than twenty-five investors.1 98 Obviously, when investors
are accredited (as on CircleUp) and are able to invest much larger sums of
money, fewer investors are necessary, so this does not necessarily mean
that more investors is not an option. However, in 2014, one study
estimated that "440 is the average number of backers in a rewards
crowdfunding campaign, compared to 96 investors on average in equity
crowdfunding campaigns."' 99 If these statistics are accurate predictions for
the future, obtaining the target number of investors will be very difficult in
many states.
In some states, companies cannot raise the maximum amount without
triggering federal registration requirements. Although the JOBS Act
increased the number of shareholders that a company could have without
registering from 500 to 2,000, it also specified that a company could not
have more than 499 non-accredited investors as shareholders without
registering. 2 00 In states like Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, and Tennessee,
where the target investor number is at least 500, companies cannot legally
raise the annual maximum amount exclusively from non-accredited
investors. Without significant contributions from accredited investors,
companies in these states (especially those with target numbers of 1,000)
will not come close to raising the maximum amount possible. States may
also have their own limitations on the number of investors that trigger
198. Lora Kolodny, Crowdfunding 101: Q&A with CircleUp CEO Ryan Caldbeck,
CROWDFUNDBEAT, http://www.crowdfundbeat.ca/crowdfunding-101-qa-with-circleup-ceo-
ryan-caldbeck/ [http://perma.cc/D8VE-C6TH ] (last visited May 17, 2016).
199. Irene Tordera, Crowdfunding: 84% of Investors Are Male, but Women Are More
Successful, CROWD VALLEY (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.crowdvalley.com/news/crowd
funding-84-of-investors-are-male-but-women-are-more-successful [http://perma.cc/VEV4-
FPS5].
200. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat.
306, 325 (2012).
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registration requirements, perhaps further limiting the attainability of these
maximum capital raises. It is not clear why states would impose limitations
that, even under an ideal situation where investors contribute as much as
possible, a company could not reach the maximum capital raise permitted
under the exemption.
C. Required Disclosures to Investors
Even when exempt from securities registration, federal and state laws
generally require that certain disclosures be provided to investors and
regulators. For state crowdfunding exemptions, the required disclosures to
investors vary.201 At a minimum, each state requires disclosures to ensure
that an offering remains exempt. Specifically, the disclosure must state that
the securities are subject to resale restrictions and that the purchased
securities are not registered with the SEC or state securities commission.20 2
A number of states seek to make this point more explicit by requiring the
disclosure to state that the investor must rely on his own examination of the
offering and the risks involved.203 Most states also require that general
information about the company, such as its name, address, and owners, be
provided to investors.20
Some states also emphasize the illiquid nature of the securities
purchased, stating that there may never be a ready market for the
securities 20 5 or that an investor may be required to bear the financial risks
of the investment for an indefinite period of time.206 Maine perhaps has the
most thorough investor disclosures, requiring all of this information, as
well as information regarding the securities' price (or method of
determining price) and the ownership and capital structure of the company,
including valuation methods. 207  The disclosure must also include
information about the risks related to minority ownership in the company,
including the issuance of additional shares and asset sales.208
With any disclosure, there is a balance between providing sufficient
information for adequate decision-making and providing a small enough
amount of information so that it is actually read. The SEC and other
201. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-21(a)(9) (Supp. 2015).
203. IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(H) (2015).
204. See, e.g., 950 MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o)(11) (2015).
205. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 139.25(i)(2) (2015).
206. Wis. STAT. § 551.202 (26)(h) (2013-14); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 16304.6-A.E (2015).
207. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A.E.
208. Id.
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regulatory agencies focus on comprehensive disclosures, sometimes
overlooking that fact that "if the users do not process information
effectively, it is not clear what good mandating disclosure does."209 In
determining how much disclosure is sufficient rather than too much, the
purpose of the disclosures is key. In the context of securities laws,
"[d]isclosure is merely the chosen means to the end of informed investor
decision making." 2 10  And, for crowdfunding specifically, the end is
informed decision making regarding risky investments by non-accredited
investors.
As the varying detail of the exemption disclosures show, states
reached different conclusions about how much information was
appropriate. Most of the crowdfunding disclosures, particularly the more
thorough ones, emphasize the risk and lack of regulation over the
investments involved. In fact, a disclosure statement such as Maine's reads
more like a warning than a general disclosure. Yet, given the goal of these
disclosures and the unfamiliarity with crowdfunding, such warning may be
necessary. Prior to crowdfunding exemptions, non-accredited investors
had very few opportunities to invest in private securities and even fewer
opportunities to do so on online platforms. As the SEC Study Regarding
Financial Literacy Among Investors found, "U.S. retail investors lack basic
financial literacy," 211 which indicates that the average crowdfund investor
may not be aware of certain risks, such as those associated with minority
ownership. As a result, more detailed and informative disclosures, such as
Maine's, and perhaps even more measures might be necessary in
crowdfunding issues.
D. Required Investor Certifications
Although all states require that certain disclosures regarding the
company and its securities be provided to investors, a few states have taken
this a step further to require that investors actively certify an understanding
of certain risks or restrictions. These certifications seem to acknowledge
that investors do not always read disclosure statements and are apparently
intended to be an additional level of investor protection.
Each of the four states with such certifications require an investor to
acknowledge, either by manual or electronic signature, that the investor is
aware that the investment is risky, that the investor may lose all of his
209. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).
210. Id. at 431.
211. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 110, at iii.
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investment, and that he can afford to do so. 2 12 For example, Washington's
exemption has a relatively simple investor certification which requires that
all investors certify the following statement: "I acknowledge that I am
investing in a high-risk, speculative business venture, that I may lose all of
my investment, and that I can afford the loss of my investment."2 13
Oregon's certification includes language similar to this, but also adds
language whereby the investor affirmatively represents she is a state
resident and understands that the offering "has not been reviewed by the
State, and no authority has expressed an opinion on the merits or accuracy
of this offering." 2 14
Indiana and Wisconsin have identical investor certifications, which
are more thorough than the previous two. In addition to the
acknowledgment of risk and lack of review by regulators, these
certifications also state that the purchased securities are illiquid, with no
ready market and therefore it may be difficult or impossible to sell or
otherwise dispose of them and, accordingly, the investor "may be required
to hold this investment indefinitely." 215 The certification also notes the
potential for tax liability as a result of the purchase.2 16
Most of the information contained in these certifications is also
contained in the required disclosures to investors, but by separating certain
pieces of information into a format requiring certification, these states seem
to indicate that certain disclosures are even more important. It is not clear
that signatures, particularly those done electronically, will guarantee that
investors read the information in the certifications, but it does seem the
chances of investors reading them are increased (as compared to general
disclosures). Further, any additional cost or time that such certifications
add to a transaction is likely small.
E. Problems with Current Exemptions
Although crowdfunding has the potential to provide a valuable new
source of funding to companies, the existing state exemptions fail to fully
utilize crowdfunding's potential in a way that sufficiently protects
non-accredited investors. Each state's exemption has its merits, but
212. IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(I) (2015); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0120(4) (updated as
of Feb. 15, 2016), http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars 400/oar_441/441 035.html
[https://perma.cc/K5ET-RJJH]; WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880(1)(h) (2014); Wis. STAT.
§ 551.202 (26)(i) (2013-2014).
213. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.880(1)(h).
214. OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0120(4).
215. IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(I); Wis. STAT. § 551.202 (26)(i).
216. IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27)(I); Wis. STAT. § 551.202 (26)(i).
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generally, the state exemptions leave room for improvement. In particular,
the annual investment limit per investor, the maximum capital raise for
companies, and the required disclosures and certifications each present
challenges to companies and investors seeking to participate in
crowdfunding. In addition to these already discussed categories, there are
several other problems that should also be addressed regarding anti-fraud
and enforcement in online crowdfunding.
i. Annual Investment Limit Per Investor
The annual limit on how much an investor can contribute to a single
company's capital raise appears to be a useful restriction in minimizing the
investor's risk exposure. However, there are two significant problems with
these restrictions in most states which, considered together, indicate that
there is a more efficient way to limit investors' risk exposure. First, the
annual investment limits are extremely low in many states, making it
difficult for small companies to effectively take advantage of the
exemptions. Second, despite these extremely low limits, the restrictions
nevertheless fail to provide adequate investor protection.
The annual limits per investor, as previously noted, range between one
hundred and ten thousand dollars annually.2 17 These limits undoubtedly
restrict the total loss that a non-accredited investor can sustain from one
investment, at least on an annual basis. However, they also place
significant burdens on companies seeking to raise large amounts through a
crowdfunding exemption, particularly in states where the investor limit is
around two thousand dollars or less. The lower the investment limit, the
more investors that a company must convince to invest in order to raise the
same amount of money. Based on the target number of investors for most
states, companies theoretically have to get hundreds of investors to
contribute in order to raise substantial money.218 Reaching out to hundreds
of investors individually is time-consuming and has costs, but the same is
true even in states that permit general solicitation.
In Oregon, for example, a company or crowdfunding platform may
engage in general advertising or solicitation, so long as the advertisements
are provided to regulators in advance and only contain certain information,
and each person viewing the advertisement "affirmatively certiflies] that
they are an Oregon resident" prior to viewing the materials.2 19 Some of
these obstacles can be easily resolved: many state funding portals require
217. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
219. OR. ADMIN. R. 441-035-0130(1)-(2) (updated as of Feb. 15, 2016), http://arcweb.
sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_400/oar_441/441_035.html [https://perma.cc/K5ET-RJJH].
[Vol. 38:267302
36
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss3/2
STRICT IN THE WRONG PLACES
residence certification before entering the site.2 20 Nevertheless, there are
still costs associated with such advertising and solicitation. Companies
cannot simply rely on the internet or a crowdfunding platform to attract
investors for them either, as many state exemptions provide that an internet
site cannot solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities if not
registered as a broker-dealer 22 1 -an expensive process that new
crowdfunding sites may want to avoid.222 The fact that equity
crowdfunding campaigns generally do not average one hundred investors
provides additional evidence of the difficulty in obtaining investments.223
Further, existing crowdfunding sites typically charge companies to use
their portals, a trend likely to continue since most state exemptions permit
an online crowdfunding portal to charge for its services. 224 CircleUp, for
example, does not charge companies to apply to be listed, but once a
company is listed (and able to raise funds), it pays $500 to establish an
escrow account and CircleUp will assess a commission based on a
percentage of the total amount raised.2 25 Fundable, a site that utilizes
equity and reward-based crowdfunding, charges companies $179 per month
($2,148 per year) to fundraise, 2 26 while EarlyShares takes a fee of 10-20%
227in an equity campaign. With these numbers, companies would have to
obtain numerous contributions just to cover the costs of listing the
campaign on an internet site.
Finally, as previously noted, the investor limits seem arbitrary based
on the large range across the states and the general failure to consider an
investor's income level. Most states do not distinguish among investors'
income beyond the accredited and non-accredited threshold, although there
is clearly a difference in the effect that an equal contribution has on
investors with different incomes.
220. See, e.g., TRUCROWD TEX., https://texas.trucrowd.com/ [https://perma.cc/S2MV-
XU7N] (last visited May 17, 2016).
221. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 551.205(1)(b)(2) (2013-2014).
222. Darke, supra note 133.
223. Tordera, supra note 199.
224. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 551.205(1)(b)(2)(e) (providing that the internet site operator
charges "a fixed amount for each offering, a variable amount based on the length of time
that the securities are offered on the Internet site, or a combination of such fixed and
variable amounts").
225. Frequently Asked Questions from Entrepreneurs, supra note 88.
226. Pricing and Fees, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/faq/pricing-and-fees
[perma.cc/DLX2-B2NZ] (last visited May 17, 2016).
227. Early Shares Review, BEST CROWDFUNDING WEBSITEs, http://best-crowdfunding-
websites.com/review/earlyshares/ [http://perma.cc/655K-B6ZY] (last visited May 17, 2016).
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Considering all of these problems and the general obstacles that
crowdfunding companies likely face in obtaining funding, this Article
suggests increasing the annual investment limit per company to a specified
percentage of an investor's annual income, or at least raising the investor
limit in all states to a minimum of five thousand dollars.
With investment limits as low as they currently are, it seems investors
would be adequately, if not overly, protected from excessive losses in
crowdfunding campaigns. But, even in states with extremely low annual
investment limits (such as Maryland's $100 limit), it does not appear this is
the case. While the annual limit will limit the amount that an investor can
lose in a single company, it fails to protect investors from sustaining great
losses from several companies even if effectively enforced. None of the
examined exemptions limit the amount that an investor can aggregately
invest across multiple crowdfunding raises, therefore, an investor could
invest the maximum annual amount in several companies. The Texas State
Securities Board recognized this problem and warned investors against it:
"An issuer can't accept more than $5,000 from a non-accredited
investor ... . Investors enticed by the new opportunity to invest in startups
could, however, seriously dent their bank accounts by putting $5,000 each
into a number of offerings."2 28 And, in a state like Maryland, where the
investor limit was undoubtedly made very low for the purpose of investor
protection, it is even easier for an investor to contribute the maximum
amount to multiple companies.
There are a number of reasons why legislators may not have included
such an aggregate investment maximum in their statutes. Logistically,
regulating the number of companies that a single investor can purchase
from would be difficult and it is not clear who would have the burden of
tracking this information. Further, the act of monitoring individuals'
investment decisions is likely an unpopular one, as it involves monitoring
how private individuals spend their money. Finally, legislators may have
thought such a limit was unnecessary. Because companies that cannot
obtain traditional institutional financing typically obtain funding from
friends and family, 22 9 the same may be true in the crowdfunding context.
Despite the ability to purchase from numerous and distant companies
through online crowdfunding, investors may decline to invest in companies
that they do not have a personal connection with and, as a result, most
investors will only purchase from a limited number of companies.
228. Information for Investors: Crowd Wisdom or "The Madness of the Crowds"?, TEX.
ST. SEC. BOARD, https://www.ssb.texas.gov/texas-securities-act-board-rules/texas-intrastate-
crowdfunding/information-investors [https://perma.cc/T8K8-Z355] (last updated Apr. 19,
2016).
229. See Entis, supra note 77.
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However, even if this logic proves to be true, relying on it does not seem
like an adequate investor protection, as it essentially relies on the
unpopularity of an exemption to serve as its regulation.
If state regulators need to warn investors against over-investing in
crowdfunding campaigns, a more effective method of preventing this
problem would be to simply impose an aggregate investment limit on
non-accredited investors' annual contributions to crowdfunding campaigns.
This could be accomplished by either imposing a maximum number of
crowdfunding campaigns to which a single investor may contribute or
imposing an aggregate dollar limit on an investor's annual crowdfunding
contributions. Both of these alternatives, discussed below, could work in
conjunction with an increased annual investor limit per company.
In sum, the investor limits create serious obstacles for companies
utilizing a crowdfunding exemption, but provide limited benefit in investor
protection.
ii. Annual Maximum Capital Raise
The annual maximum capital raise for companies ranges from
$100,000 to $5,000,000 across the states. Considering that existing
crowdfunding campaigns involving accredited investors do not generally
raise amounts approaching $5,000,000,230 this particular limit appears to be
high enough to not actually serve as a restriction on most companies.
However, the difficulty in discerning what is a reasonable annual maximum
capital raise indicates a problem with the current limits: one size does not
in fact fit all companies. Not only do different industries require different
financing needs, but even companies within similar industries present
different amounts of funding based on their specific goals and needs. And
companies at different business phases will likely have different funding
needs.
Even considering these differences, the maximum capital raises in
some states are so low that it is not clear which companies would actually
have significant funding needs met by the exemption. The crowdfunding
exemption is intended to be less expensive than traditional registration, but
there are still costs involved. If a company can only raise a few hundred
thousand dollars, yet still has to endure the same costs-including things
such as filing notice, providing disclosures, paying funding portals and
other advertising fees, etc.-it is not clear that claiming the exemption is
even worth the effort. The company may instead choose to claim a
230. Kolodny, supra note 198 ("The average company on CircleUp raises close to $1
million.").
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different exemption with higher capital-raising limits or, if possible,
relocate to another state with more flexible exemptions.231
Imposing different limits based on a company's industry or specific
needs would be nearly impossible to implement logistically and some states
likely consider lower limits a necessary element to prevent or minimize
fraud. To address these concerns while still tailoring the maximum raise to
better fit companies' needs, states could alter the maximum capital raise
amount depending on the financial information and disclosures provided to
investors. Effectively doing so would also require improving existing
disclosure requirements.
iii. Disclosures
Currently, the required state disclosures to investors range from
containing merely the information required by federal law to remain
exempt, to more detailed warnings about illiquidity and minority
ownership. Crowdfunding is new territory for both companies and
investors, and thus it seems that more disclosure is better for a number of
reasons. First, the lack of financial literacy among retail investors 232
indicates that many of the problems unique to small, private companies
may also be unfamiliar. Because all investments contain some level of
risk, investors may not appreciate the increased risk unique to small
businesses and start-up companies. Second, the ability to invest in
crowdfunding campaigns online enables investors to quickly make
purchases without consulting others. Because investors may not take the
time to consult others or do independent research, it is important that
sufficient information is readily available at the time of investment.
Disclosures that only provide information about resale restrictions and
lack of registration do not seem sufficient to help unsophisticated investors
make informed decisions. Investors may not be fully aware of what this
information means or may not appreciate the significance of it without
further context. For example, these disclosures indicate that securities may
be transferable at some point in the future, but fail to warn that even if
transfer is legally possible, there may never be a market for such securities.
In order to provide full information to investors, states should adopt
disclosure requirements that include information not only about the risks of
the investment, but also the illiquid nature of the securities, specific risks
231. Changing states, under most exemptions, would require changing the state of
incorporation and principal place of business, so would really only make sense if the
company were confident it could raise enough money to offset all of these costs.
232. See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 110, at iii.
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regarding that company, and other information regarding investments in
small, private companies.
In addition to the substantive problems with the disclosures, the state
exemptions also generally do not address the delivery or format of
disclosures, beyond indicating that the information should be provided
prior to the purchase of securities.23 3 However, the delivery of disclosures
is always important, and this is especially true as the amount of information
23provided increases.234 For example, the SEC found that investors generally
favor "layered" disclosure, whereby "key information is sent or given to
the investor and more detailed information is provided online and, upon
request, is sent in paper or by e-mail." This form of disclosure enables
investors to choose the type and amount of information they wish to
review, as well as the format (online or hardcopy, etc.) in which they view
it.2 36 If states increase the amount of information provided to investors,
they should likewise implement requirements governing the format and
delivery of such disclosures in order to ensure that they are both read and
understood.
iv. Certifications
Currently, only four states require investors to make a certification of
their understanding of the investment and disclosures. When investors are
able to make purchases online, there is no way to ensure that disclosures
are read or investments are fully understood. However, most of the state
exemptions do not impose any requirements to even try to increase the
likelihood of disclosures being read. Regulators can never guarantee that
all disclosures will be read and understood, but requiring certification
seems like a simple way to increase the likelihood. Even with the brief
disclosures that most states currently require, certifications would be
helpful, but if states improve their disclosures to include more detailed
information, certifications will be even more important.
The states that currently require investor certifications can also
improve. These exemptions provide little guidance on the delivery or
233. Maine, for example, provides that the disclosure shall be provided to investors and
potential investors. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A(E) (2015).
234. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 110, at ii-iv (finding that investors prefer
clear, concise, and understandable language, and "wherever possible, the use of a summary
document containing key information about an investment product or service").
235. Id. at iv n.4 (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ENHANCED DISCLOSURE AND NEW
PROSPECTUS DELIVERY OPTION FOR REGISTERED OPEN-END MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT
COMPANIES 60-61 (Jan. 13, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/rules/finaV2009/33-8998.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK78-DMSB)).
236. Id.
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format of such certifications. When transactions are completed exclusively
online, certifications could feasibly be completed through single clicks
(such as "I Accept" buttons). Because issuers and funding portals both
have an incentive to encourage more investing, there is reason to make
certifications inconspicuous and easy to accept. States should impose more
specific requirements about the format of certifications, perhaps by
requiring investors to type signatures or whole certifications, or by banning
simple one-click certifications.
v. Other Problems
In addition to these problems, the state exemptions also fail to address
the concerns of fraud and the lack of securities law enforcement in
crowdfunding. This is particularly problematic since many of the state
exemptions explicitly reference securities sales via the internet, a medium
with an increased risk of fraud and inadequate enforcement. While many
states passed statutory provisions or rules regulating the online platforms,
the exemptions generally fail to regulate issuers in the online context.
Apart from the notice requirements to state regulators, there is little
evidence of screening by the state prior to a company beginning its
crowdfunding campaign. Even with the notice requirement, it is not clear
how much screening state regulators could do since many exemptions
simply require that the notice be filed sometime before the offering
beginS237 and others only require that it be ten days before238-leaving very
little time for regulators to extensively review the company before it begins
accepting money. In order to help prevent fraud, states can provide more
time for regulatory screening of companies prior to the offering and can
also mandate that funding portals have some responsibility for the
companies they list by requiring pre-listing screening.
Related to these concerns of fraud, the state exemptions also fail to
address the concerns regarding a lack of enforcement when laws are broken
in crowdfunding campaigns. Because individual investors may have very
little money at stake and, in some states, the aggregate amount invested
may also be very small, there are concerns that wrongdoing will go
unchecked by both investors and regulators. This problem may be
mitigated to some extent if investors are able to invest more money, but
allowing investors to lose more money is not a solution to the enforcement
problem.
Again, more regulation is likely the best solution to this problem, but
state entities can also pass some of this responsibility to funding platforms.
237. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A)(v) (2012).
238. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.2202(y)(ii) (Supp. 2015).
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States can require funding platforms to regularly monitor the companies
they list and also hold them financially responsible for certain actions that
occur on their platforms.
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES
Based on the specific problems pointed out in the previous Part, this
Part suggests specific changes to help improve the state exemptions.
A. Raise the Investor Limit Per Company and Impose an Aggregate Limit
Most states fail to distinguish among investors with income levels
below $200,000, although these investors are undoubtedly in different
financial situations. The state exemptions should alter the investor limits
per company to more accurately reflect income levels. States could adopt
provisions like that in Massachusetts, which distinguishes investment size
based on whether income is above or below $100,000.239 Or, states could
impose a flat percentage applicable to all non-accredited investors, such as
5% of annual income. Although either change would require additional
regulation in order to confirm income levels, such certifications are already
required when distinguishing between accredited and non-accredited
investors. The burden could be on investors and funding platforms to
certify that non-accredited investors have the appropriate income level for
the investments they wish to make. However, because income levels can
change from year to year, such regulation and certification may be simpler
if the Massachusetts approach is taken. This way, investors need only
certify that they meet one of a few income thresholds, rather than states
requiring a determination of an investor's exact income every year. By
imposing requirements like that in Massachusetts, states can enable
investors to support small businesses while still limiting losses attributable
to a single company to a reasonable amount.
Then, to better protect investors against numerous unsuccessful
crowdfunding campaigns, states could implement an aggregate
crowdfunding investment limit. These limits could take one of two forms:
(1) they could restrict the aggregate amount that each investor can annually
contribute to all crowdfunding campaigns; or alternatively, (2) they could
restrict the number of crowdfunding campaigns to which each investor can
contribute, regardless of dollar amount.
The first option, limiting each investor's aggregate investment
amount, would give investors flexibility in selecting numerous companies
to invest in, but would be logistically challenging. States could impose a
239. 950 MAss. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o) (2015).
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flat maximum investment amount, as most exemptions currently do in their
annual investment limits per company. A state like Tennessee, for
example, that limits each investor to contributing $10,000 to a company
annually,24 0 could impose an aggregate investment limit of $50,000 per
investor. Tennessee investors could then contribute the maximum amount
to each of five crowdfunding companies or smaller amounts to numerous
companies. However, this solution fails to adequately distinguish among
investors who, though all non-accredited, have different financial
situations.
Considering these complications, the second alternative, limiting the
total number of crowdfunding campaigns to which a single investor can
contribute annually, would likely be simpler to administer. Based on the
exemption's annual investment limit, states could impose a maximum
number of companies in which investors should reasonably be permitted to
invest. Funding platforms could be responsible for monitoring this
information, which could be easily done by assigning each investor a
unique identification number (or using one that already exists, such as
social security number). Since the amount that an investor can contribute
to a single company would depend on income level, using the same number
of campaigns for all investors would still have the result of distinguishing
individuals based on income.
B. Alter Maximum Capital Raise Based on Disclosures
Crowdfunding exemptions could also be made more effective by
altering the annual maximum capital raise based on the financial
disclosures provided by a company. Indiana, Massachusetts, and
Wisconsin already have such provisions and allow companies to raise up to
$2,000,000 if audited financial statements are provided, and $1,000,000 if
not.24 1 Such a change more accurately reflects the fact that, although
disclosure is a critical part of preventing fraud, companies have different
needs and goals. By distinguishing companies based on their provided
disclosures, companies are able to raise additional capital at the cost of
more disclosure, while companies that do not need as substantial funding
can avoid such costs. The exact dollar limits and level of disclosure may
vary by state, depending on the investor limit, state economy size, and type
of companies expected to utilize the exemption.
240. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 48-1-103(a)(13)(A)(iii) ($10,000 is the limit for non-accredited
investors).
241. IND. CODE § 23-19-2-2(27) (2015); MASS. CODE REGS. § 14.402(B)(13)(o)(4)
(B)(2015); Wis. STAT. § 551.202 (2013-2014).
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Regulating crowdfunding capital raises in this way may seem
restrictive, considering most federal exemptions do not impose such
requirements. But, since a crowdfunding offering can only reach residents
of that company's state, the total amount that could be raised would likely
be less than that of a federally exempt company, making smaller limits
more appropriate. More importantly, because fraud is a major concern in
the crowdfunding context,242 it is reasonable to impose more stringent
disclosure requirements in order to limit the opportunity for fraud.
C. Improve Disclosures and Require Certifications in Coherent Manner
The exemptions should also be improved by requiring investor
certifications and altering disclosures so that, together, the certifications
and disclosures provide informative and understandable information to
investors. Improving these elements requires changes to both the substance
and form of the existing disclosures and certifications.
The SEC found that, "with respect to investment product disclosures,
investors favor summary documents containing key information about the
investment product," 24 3 which makes sense, as this provides investors the
opportunity to easily read important material, then seek additional
information for those aspects that are not understood or seem more
important. By requiring both certifications and disclosures, states can force
companies to provide information in this investor-friendly manner: the
certifications can contain key information in a summary format (since the
signature requirement makes them more likely to be read), with the full
disclosures including the necessary detail.
As the summary information and material more likely to be read, it is
important that certifications contain the information that is most critical and
least likely to be known by an investor. In addition to stating that the
securities are not registered, certifications should require investors to
acknowledge that they are investing in a high risk offering, that they may
lose their investment, and can afford to do so-language frequently
included in the existing disclosures. The resale restrictions should also be
included, but in a more meaningful way than currently done. The
exemptions generally state that the securities are not registered and cannot
be resold unless they become registered or fit under another exemption. 2 44
While helpful, this language neglects to inform investors that, even if the
securities become registered or remain exempt, selling them may not be an
option. Language such as that in the Wisconsin statute, emphasizing that
242. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
243. U.S. SEC.& EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 110, at iv.
244. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-6-11(a)(14)(j) (Supp. 2015).
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an investor "may be required to hold this investment indefinitely" is
instructive.245 This information can easily be incorporated into a
certification that is still concise and easy to understand, such as:
I acknowledge that these securities are subject to the restrictions on
transferability and resale. I understand that even if these securities are no
longer subject to these restrictions, there may be no ready market for the
securities and I may still be unable to sell or transfer them. Therefore, I
may have to bear the financial risks of this investment for an indefinite
period of time.
A certification may also be used to signal investors to other information
contained in the disclosures, serving its function as a summary of the full
disclosure. For example, when financial statements are required within the
disclosure materials, a certification could simply state, "I have reviewed
and understand the attached financial statements."
By separating the certifications and disclosures, there is an added
emphasis on investor certifications, making it even more important to
ensure that investors read them. At the extreme end, states could require
investors to write or type the certifications, rather than simply sign a page
on which they are already typed. A middle approach would be to require
individual signatures for each statement or section of a certification, which
would ideally encourage investors to read each section. At a minimum,
states should also clarify that investors must be required to at least type his
or her name, effectively banning one-click acceptances of certifications.
This increased emphasis on certifications also makes it tempting to be
over-inclusive in the disclosure requirements, since investors will
essentially be given a guide of the most important information to help them
through the disclosures. However, overwhelmingly large disclosures will
reduce both the certifications' and disclosures' utility. Instead, the
disclosures should maintain a focus on the most important information,
building off that included in existing exemptions' disclosures. The SEC
found that retail investors find information about fees and expenses,
investment performance, principal risks, and investment objectives useful
and relevant prior to purchasing an investment product.246 While many
companies utilizing the crowdfunding exemption may not have investment
performance information to provide, the other pieces of information could
and should be included in disclosures. Further, the disclosures should
include information tailored to a crowdfunding issue, rather than just
language common to all registration-exempt securities.
245. Wis. STAT. § 551.202(26)(i) (2013-2014).
246. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 110, at iv.
312 [Vol. 38:267
46
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss3/2
STRICT IN THE WRONG PLACES
Maine's required disclosure largely achieves this, requiring
information such as the issuer's business plan and intended use of the
offering proceeds, a description of the financial condition of the issuer, the
target offering amount and deadline to reach it, and a description of the
ownership and capital structure of the issuer.247 Maine's disclosure also
requires information about the risks of minority ownership and "risks
associated with corporate actions," both of which seem relevant to
crowdfunding issuers that may be startups or other companies that may
eventually be acquired by other companies. 248  In addition to this
information, the disclosure could provide information about the fees
charged by any brokers or online funding portals being used. This Article
suggests adopting disclosure requirements including these elements, with
the required financial disclosures depending on those mandated by the
annual maximum capital raise provisions.
As more substance is added to disclosures, states also need to impose
requirements to ensure that this additional information is presented in a
form that investors readily understand. Disclosures should be made
compatible with the certifications, providing the information referenced in
the certifications in a logical order. In sum, states should redesign required
disclosures to create a coherent system whereby certifications and
disclosures function together to make an understandable information
system that requires investor signatures.
D. Other Recommended Changes
While many of the above changes are designed to help protect
investors in crowdfunding, even the most informed investors can be victims
of securities fraud. States need to either implement new anti-fraud
provisions or tailor existing ones to better protect investors online. Beyond
reading the disclosures and performing adequate research prior to an
investment, it is not clear if there is much else that states can expect of
investors to protect themselves from fraud. Thus, additional anti-fraud
measures may be the responsibility of regulators. One alternative is to
mandate that regulators provide more detailed screenings of companies
before an offering begins. To avoid such screening becoming a new form
of registration, it could be limited to the information and disclosures
provided to investors. Exemptions could require that prior to an offering
beginning, all information to be provided to investors be submitted to state
regulators, taking the place of the existing notice requirement. Such
information would need to be submitted early enough for the securities
247. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16304.6-A.E (2015).
248. Id. § 16304.6-A.E(9)(e).
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commission to review the materials, with the exact period of time
depending on that state's regulators and resources. Regulators are in a
better position to identify potential issues in a company or its owners and
also have the ability to request more information from them if necessary.
Alternatively or additionally, regulators can pass some of this
responsibility for screening onto the crowdfunding platforms. A number of
crowdfunding platforms currently require companies to apply to be
listed.249 Platforms have an incentive to select legitimate, more promising
companies so that the platform can earn money off the campaign. This
incentive would help to remove questionable companies or owners from
the crowdfunding market. Obviously, placing such reliance on the
platforms requires that they too be adequately regulated and do not become
vehicles for fraud.
When these measures are not enough, effective enforcement of
securities laws will be necessary. Again, states do not want to subject
companies to extensive ongoing reporting requirements, effectively making
exemption-status meaningless. However, through appropriate regulation of
platforms, states can obtain reliable information to help facilitate ongoing
monitoring. Platforms can be required to regularly examine their listed
campaigns and companies and report either all or suspicious activity to
regulators. If applicable, platforms can also be required to ensure that a
company does not access investor funds until the target offering amount is
reached. Investors who contributed to companies with unsuccessful
campaigns will then be guaranteed to have their entire investment returned
to them. Likewise, withholding funds until the campaign is complete
provides investors, platforms, and regulators with more time to receive
information about companies before investor funds are spent. States should
also require platforms to communicate with investors, either through a
post-investment review process or survey. This way, investors will be in a
better position to report questionable or fraudulent activity, even if they
decline to take legal action.
States could also impose financial liability on crowdfunding platforms
that, whether knowingly or not, allow fraud to occur through their listings.
However, because states do not want to discourage the creation of funding
platforms or encourage a platform to cover fraud it discovers, such
penalties would need to be low-perhaps the fees collected off that
fraudulent campaign.
249. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions from Entrepreneurs: How Do I List My
Company on CircleUp?, CIRCLEUP, https://circleup.com/entrepreneur-education/faq/
#faql 17 [https://perma.cc/K943-3AJ9] (last visited May 17, 2016) (explaining the
application process).
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CONCLUSION
The enactment of numerous crowdfunding exemptions in a relatively
short time shows the enthusiasm that lawmakers have for crowdfunding;
however, these quick enactments have also limited the opportunities for
lawmakers to compare exemptions and learn what types of requirements
make crowdfunding most successful for companies and investors. The
above examination of these exemptions demonstrates that many of them
can be improved by adopting effective provisions seen in others. These
suggestions are intended to improve existing crowdfunding exemptions in a
way that helps to achieve the goals that led to their enactment: investor
protection and small businesses growth.
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